Negligence - Acts or Omissions Constituting Negligence - Whether Landowners and Occupiers Owe Firemen and Policemen the Duty of Reasonable Care by Lambert, G. R.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 38 Issue 1 Article 6 
April 1961 
Negligence - Acts or Omissions Constituting Negligence - 
Whether Landowners and Occupiers Owe Firemen and Policemen 
the Duty of Reasonable Care 
G. R. Lambert 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
G. R. Lambert, Negligence - Acts or Omissions Constituting Negligence - Whether Landowners and 
Occupiers Owe Firemen and Policemen the Duty of Reasonable Care, 38 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 75 (1961). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol38/iss1/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
NEGLIGENCE - AcTs OR OMISSIONS CONSTITUTING NEGLIGENCE -
WHETHER LANDOWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OWE FIREMEN AND POLICEMEN
THE DUTY OF REASONABLE CAl--The question of whether a landowner
or occupier is liable to firemen for the negligent maintenance of his prem-
ises was re-examined1 by the Illinois Supreme Court in the recent case
of Dini v. Naiditch.2 Therein, the defendant owners maintained a busi-
ness on the ground floor of their four-story building and the defend-
ant lessees operated a hotel on the upper three floors of the same
building. Access to the hotel floors was by way of a wooden stairway
which was supported by stringers that were nailed to the walls rather
than recessed. Upon responding to the fire alarm radioed in by a police
officer, several firemen proceeded up the stairway to enhance rescue oper-
ations. One fireman was on the second floor landing and two firemen
were on the stairway between the second and third floors when the entire
stairway collapsed without warning and fell into a heap at the first floor
level. One fireman was killed and another fireman suffered permanent
injuries. Wrongful death and personal injury actions were brought in
the Superior Court of Cook County where it was alleged that the de-
fendants were liable for the negligent maintenance of their premises in
violation of certain fire safety ordinances. The evidence that the prem-
ises were in an unsafe condition prior to and at the time of the fire was
extensive and the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs; however, the
Superior Court of Cook County entered a judgment for the defendants
notwithstanding the verdicts on the ground that there was no legal basis
for liability. On direct appeal, 3 the Illinois Supreme Court in a four-
to-three decision reversed the judgment and remanded the case with
directions that the jury verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs be reinstated
by the lower court. The Gibson v. Leonard case, 4 along with several Illi-
nois Appellate court cases,5 were expressly overruled, and the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that an action should lie against a landowner
for failure to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of his prop-
1 The Illinois Supreme Court examined this question in the case of Gibson v.
Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N. E. 182 (1892).
2 20 Ill. (2d) 406, 170 N. E. (2d) 881 (1960). Schaefer, C. J. and Klingbiel, J.
wrote dissenting opinions. House, J. also dissented.
3 Direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court is authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat.
1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75, where the validity of a municipal ordinance is involved
and the trial judge certifies that such an appeal is required in the public interest.
Apparently, it was upon this ground that the Illinois Supreme Court had juris-
diction to review the present case; however, the majority opinion did not specify
the grounds upon which the direct appeal was authorized and one of the dis-
senting judges denied that any valid grounds existed.
4 143 Ill. 182, 32 N. E. 182 (1892).
5 Volluz v. East St. Louis Light & Power Co., 210 Ill. App. 565 (1918) ; Thrift
v. Vandalia R. Co., 145 Ill. App. 414 (1908).
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erty resulting in the injury or death of a fireman rightfully on the
premises, fighting the fire at a place where he might reasonably be ex-
pected to be. As an additional basis of liability, it was held that the
fire safety ordinances, being general in their terms, included firemen within
their protection, and that the jury reasonably found that the defend-
ants violated these ordinances and that such violations proximately caused
the injury and death of the firemen.
In dealing with the liability of a landowner or occupier to one in-
jured by conditions or activities on the premises, the law has traditionally
applied a formula which designates unlawful entrants "trespassers" and
lawful entrants "licensees" or "invitees",6 and to each class, the land-
owner or occupant is held to a respective duty of care. As to lawful
entrants, the first American case which recognized the licensee-invitee dis-
tinction was Sweeney v. Old Colony & Newport R. Co.7 Therein, Chief
Justice Bigelow held that a landowner was bound to keep his premises
in a safe condition for those who entered by his invitation, but that the
same obligation did not extend to those who entered by his mere permission.
Firemen and policemen in the performance of official duties enter
private premises by public right; therefore, their entry is actually lawful,
even though independent of any invitation or permission of the land-
owner.8 Since a landowner owes an obligation to consider the safety of
those lawfully on his land, the courts have been faced with the problem
of categorizing firemen and policemen as licensees or invitees in order to
determine the degree of care to which such public officials are entitled.
Although firemen and policemen have been denied relief on the
grounds of contributory negligence, 9 assumption of risk,10 no breach of
duty" or proximately caused injury,12 most jurisdictions have recognized
the rule that recovery should be denied because, absent a statute or or-
dinance, a member of a public fire or police department enters the prem-
6 See Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts (Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis,
1926), p. 159.
7 10 Allen (Mass.) 368, 87 Am. Dec. 644 (1865).
8 See Bohlen, op. cit., p. 162.
9 Egan v. Werfel et al., 246 App. Div. 553, 282 N. Y. S. 834 (1935) : Glander v.
Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 155 Wis. 381, 144 N. W. 972 (1914).
10 McDaniel v. The m/s Lisholt et al., 155 F. Supp. 619 (1957) ; Suttie v. Sun
Oil Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 3 (1931). See also Baker v. Otis Elevator Co., 78 App.
Div. 513, 79 N. Y. S. 663 (1903), where relief was denied for an unreasonable and
unanticipated entry.
11 Clark v. Boston & M. R., 78 N. H. 428, 101 A. 795 (1917).
12 Ga. R. & Banking Co. et al. v. Konkle, 36 Ga. App. 569, 137 S. E. 113 (1927);
Woods v. Miller et al., 30 App. Div. 232, 52 N. Y. S. 217 (1898).
DISCUSSION OF RECEIVT DECISIONS
ises as a mere licensee by operation of law, to whom the landowner owes
no greater duty than to refrain from inflicting a wilful or wanton injury.
13
Many courts have long considered this general rule, imposing no
affirmative duty on the landowner or occupier to make the land safe
for firemen and policemen, very harsh; therefore, it is not surprising
that over the years various exceptions and distinctions have developed.
For example, it has become widely accepted that the landowner
owes a licensee the duty (1) to refrain from active negligence when the
presence of the licensee is known, and (2) to inform the licensee of any
known concealed dangerous conditions when the opportunity to warn
exists. 14 Firemen and policemen have recovered on the basis of active
negligence in some cases,15 and landowners and occupiers have been fre-
13 Pennebaker et al. v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 P.
459 (1910); Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 P. 203
(1910); Baxley v. Williams Const. Co. et al., 98 Ga. App. 662, 106 S. E. (2d) 799
(1958); Todd v. Armour & Co., 44 Ga. App. 609, 162 S. E. 394 (1932) ; Pincock v.
McCoy, 48 Ida. 227, 281 P. 371 (1929) ; Casey v. Adams, 234 Ill. 350, 84 N. E. 933
(1908) ; Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N. E. 182 (1892) ; Volluz v. East St.
Louis Light & Power Co., 210 Ill. App. 565 (1918) ; Thrift v. Vandalia R. Co., 145
Ill. App. 414 (1908) ; Eckels et al. v. Maher, 137 Ill. App. 4-5 (1907) ; Woodruff v.
Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N. E. 1113 (1893) ; Steinwedel v. Hilbert et al., 149 Md.
121, 131 A. 44 (1925) ; Carroll v. Hemenway et al., 315 Mass. 45, 51 N. E. (2d)
952 (1943) ; Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N. E. (2d) 1008
(1936) ; Wynn v. Sullivan, 294 Mass. 562, 3 N. E. (2d) 236 (1936) ; Brennan v.
Keene, 237 Mass. 556, 130 N. E. 82 (1921) ; Creeden v. Boston & M. R., 193 Mass.
280, 79 N. E. 344 (1906); Berry v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 188 Mass. 536, 74
N. E. 933 (1905); Mulerone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 4 N. W. (2d) 97 (1942).
141 A. L. R. 580; Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N. W.
693 (1899); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n et al., 154 Neb. 805, 49 N. W. (2d)
707 (1951) ; Fentress v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n et al., 149 Neb. 355, 31 N. W.
(2d) 225 (1948) ; Trouton v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co..
77 Neb. 821, 110 N. W. 569 (1906); New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Co.
v. Anderson, 73 Neb. 84, 102 N. W. 89 (1905); New Omaha Thomson-Houston
Electric Co. v. Bendson, 73 Neb. 49, 102 N. W. 96 (1905) ; Eckes v. Stetler et al.,
98 App. Div. 76, 90 N. Y. S. 473 (1904) ; Kitheart v. Feldman et al., 89 Okla. 276,
215 P. 419 (1923) ; Drake v. Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 85 A. 14 (1912) ; Beehler v. Daniels
et al., 18 R. I. 563, 29 A. 6 (1894); Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Fryar, 132
Tenn. 612, 179 S. W. 127 (1915). See annotations in 13 A. L. R. 637 and 141
A. L. R. 584. See also annotations in 61 A. L. R. 1028.
14 Prosser, Law of Torts (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1955), 2d Ed.. p.
445. See also In Restatement, Law of Torts (1934), Vol. 2, §§ 341-342, pp. 929-938.
15 Poole v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 23 Ga. App. 285, 97 S. E. 886 (1919) ; Ryan
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 315 Ill. App. 65, 42 N. E. (2d) 128 (1942) ; Bandosz
v. Daigger & Co., 255 Ill. App. 494 (1930) ; Ahern v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co..
210 Mass. 506, 97 N. E. 72 (1912) ; Ingalls v. Adams Exp. Co., 44 Minn. 128, 46,
N. W. 325 (1890) ; Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co. et al., 22 Mont.
312, 56 P. 358 (1899) ; Lamb et al. v. Sebach, 52 Ohio App. 362, 3 N. E. (2d) 686
(1935) ; Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens et al., 156 S. W. (2d) 1010 (1941) :
Andrews v. York, 192 S. W. 338 (1917) ; Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. et al.
v. Johansen. 107 Tex. 336, 179 S. W. 853 (1915); Boyd v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.,
141 S. W. 1076 (1911) ; Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. et al. v. O'Leary, 136
S. W. 601 (1911); Bradburn v. Whatcom County Ry. & Light Co., 45 Wash. 582,
88 P. 1020 (1907). It is interesting to note the extent some of the Texas cases
have gone in applying the active negligence exception.
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quently liable for their failure to warn of hidden dangers or unusual
hazards. 16 The failure to warn exception was considered in many cases,
but firemen and policemen were denied relief because a warning was
given,' 7 the danger was obvious,18 the defendant was unaware of the con-
dition,19 the defendant had no duty to warn,20 or the exception did not
extend to structural defects.
21
The majority rule was avoided in one instance on the proposition
that a policeman entering at the express request of the occupant is an
invitee ;22 however, several courts have expressly refused to attach the
invitee status to firemen under similar circumstances.23 It has been only
under unique situations that the courts have predicated landowner liability
on the ground that the firemen and policemen were invitees,
2 4 or business
visitors.25 Although the Tennessee Supreme Court held the deceased fire-
16 Scottish Rite Supreme Council v. Jacobs, 266 F. (2d) 675 (1959) ; Shypulski
v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N. W. (2d) 549 (1951) ; Schwab
v. Rubel Corp. et al., 286 N. Y. 525, 37 N. E. (2d) 234 (1941) ; Jenkins et al. v.
313-321 W. 37th St. Corp. et al., 284 N. Y. 397, 31 N. E. (2d) 503 (1940) ; James v.
Cities Service Oil Co., 66 Ohio App. 87, 31 N. E. (2d) 872 (1939) ; Lamb et al.
v. Sebach, 52 Ohio App. 362, 3 N. E. (2d) 686 (1935) ; Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Lansinger, 108 Ohio St. 377, 140 N. E. 770 (1923). See annotation in 55 A. L. R.
(2d) 525. See also Smith v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 83 N. H. 452, 144 A.
57 (1928), 61 A. L. R. 1015; Campbell et al. v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N. J. Misc. R. 723.
194 A. 873 (1937) ; City of Youngstown v. Cities Service Oil Co., 66 Ohio App. 97,
31 N. E. (2d) 876 (1940).
17 Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n. et al., 154 Neb. 805, 49 N. W. (2d)
707 (1951) ; Duane v. Pa. R. Co., 310 Pa. 334, 165 A. 231 (1933).
18 Todd v. Armour & Co., 44 Ga. App. 609, 162 S. E. 394 (1932); Wax v. Co-
Operative Refinery Ass'n et al., 154 Neb. 805, 49 N. W. (2d) 707 (1951) ; Davy v.
Greenlaw et al., 101 N. H. 134, 135 A. (2d) 900 (1957) ; Gannon v. Royal Proper-
ties, 285 App. Div. 131, 136 N. Y. S. (2d) 129 (1954) ; Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v.
Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S. W. 646 (1922).
19 Litch v. White et al., 160 Cal. 497, 117 P. 515 (1911) ; Duane v. Pa. R. Co.,
310 Pa. 334, 165 A. 231 (1933).
20 Trouton v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co., 77 Neb. 821,
110 N. W. 569 (1906); New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Anderson,
73 Neb. 84, 102 N. W. 89 (1905); New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v.
Bendson, 73 Neb. 49, 102 N. W. 96 (1905).
21 Nastasio v. Cinnamon, 295 S. W. (2d) 117 (1956); Anderson v. Cinnamon,
365 Mo. 304, 282 S. W. (2d) 445 (1955), 55 A. L. R. (2d) 516. In the second case
it was stated that there was no duty to warn licensees of structural conditions
due to age and natural deterioration or to improper construction because such
conditions are capable of being observed and ascertained.
22 Learoyd v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315 (1885).
23 Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 P. 203 (1910);
Roberts v. Rosenblatt et al., 146 Conn. 110, 148 A. (2d) 142 (1959) ; Baxley v.
WNrilliams Const. Co. et al., 98 Ga. App. 662, 106 S. E. (2d) 799 (1958) ; Smith v.
Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 83 N. H. 452, 144 A. 57 (1928). These courts have
justified this rule on the basis that the response is made to a call to duty rather
than to an invitation.
24 Clinkscales v. Mundkoski et al., 183 Okla. 12, 79 P. (2d) 562 (1938) ; St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. et al. v. Williams, 176 Okla. 465, 56 P. (2d) 815
(1936).
25 Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N. W. (2d) 992 (1954).
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man was an invitee in Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna,26 recovery
was denied because his death was the result of a patent defect.
Only in recent years, have a number of courts shown a tendency to
avoid the strictness of the traditional licensee-invitee formula by question-
ing its applicability to firemen and policemen. In holding that a police
officer was not a mere licensee, the court in the case of Ryan v. Chicago
& N. W. Ry. Co. stated: "A rule of law which holds one thus upon the
land of another as a mere licensee is like putting 'new wine into old
bottles.' The complex and difficult questions of right arising out of our
modern civilization cannot be decided by a worn out formula based on
feudal customs which have passed away. "27 Subsequently, several courts
have announced the rule that firemen and policemen have a status sui
generis, because any rule flatly categorizing firemen and policemen with
invitees and licensees disregards the basic fact that firemen and policemen
enter private premises without invitation or license of the landowner.2 8
A Connecticut court refused to label a fireman a licensee, but it held his
status was akin to that of a licensee.
29
Another distinction has been made which has permitted a few courts,
in a limited factual situation, to impose upon the landowner the duty
of reasonable care for the protection of lawful entrants. Although this
distinction has been called the New York rule, it was apparently an
extension of an old Massachusetts decision.30 In Meiers v. Koch Brewery,3 1
the New York Court of Appeals in a four-to-three decision limited its
decision in favor of the plaintiff to the precise facts before it-to the case
of one not a licensee, who entered business property as of right over a
way prepared as a means of access for those entitled to enter and was
injured by the negligence of the landowner, who failed to keep that way
in a reasonably safe condition for those using it as it was intended to be
26 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S. W. 646 (1922).
27 315 Ill. App. 65 at 75, 42 N. E. (2d) 128 at 132 (1942). This decision was
treated in 28 Cornell L. Q. 232, where the author submitted that the holding in
the Ryan case was an undesirable extension of liability.
28 Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N. W. (2d) 549
(1951) ; Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304, 282 S. W. (2d) 445 (1955), 55 A. L. R.
(2d) 516; Krauth v. Geller, 31 N. J. 270, 157 A. (2d) 129 (1960) ; Beedenbender
v. Midtown Properties, 2 App. Div. (2d) 276, 164 N. Y. S. (2d) 276 (1957).
29 Roberts v. Rosenblatt et al., 146 Conn. 110, 148 A. (2d) 142 (1959).
30 Learoyd v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315 (1885). Although the court gave the
policeman the status of an invitee on the assumption he was invited by the occu-
pant, the court held it was the duty of the defendant to keep the approach to his
premises in a safe condition.
31229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491 (1920), 13 A. L. R. 633. This case was recently
discussed in 25 Albany L. Rev. 105.
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used.32 Subsequent New York decisions have denied that the Meiers case
made firemen and policemen invitees, 33 or that such public officials are
necessarily entitled to the duty of care owed invitees. 34 Apparently, up
to the time of the present case, the New York rule had been accepted
in only one other jurisdiction.
35
Courts have also been able in some cases to hold landowners liable
for the injuries suffered by firemen and policemen on the grounds that
a statute or municipal ordinance had been violated. Apparently the first
such case was Parker v. Barnard.36 Therein, a police officer entered the
building for inspection purposes and fell down an unguarded elevator
well, and it was held the plaintiff could recover since the statute was
intended to provide protection for all persons who were in buildings in
the lawful performance of their duties. Subsequent cases have also held
that firemen and policemen were within that class of persons protected
by legislation specific 3. 7 or general3 8 in its terms. One ordinance specifically
conferred upon the family and relatives an additional right of action
for the death of a fireman, but such right did not extend to the executor
or administrator of the deceased fireman's estate.39 However, the majority,
of jurisdictions have denied liability where a statute or ordinance was
involved because such legislation was not enacted for the benefit of fire-
men and policemen,40 or the defendant had violated no common law
41
32 The theory of the decision is that the firemen might assume that a drive-
way, prepared by the defendant for the use of those having business with him, was
safe; that the driveway was adapted and designed to be used as the plaintiff
fireman was using It; and that the fireman was not a licensee or trespasser, but
was rightfully on the premises, and a duty of reasonable care was owing to him.
See 13 A. L. R. 641.
33 Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, 2 App. Div. (2d) 276, 164 N. Y. S.
(2d) 276 (1957).
34 Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., 274 N. Y. 106, 8 N. E. (2d) 296 (1937).
35 Taylor v. Palmetto Theater Co., 204 S. C. 1, 28 S. E. (2d) 538 (1943).
36 135 Mass. 116, 46 Am. Rep. 4-50 (1883).
37 Racine v. Morris et al., 201 N. Y. 240, 94 N. E. 864 (1911).
38 Rathbun v. White et al., 157 Cal. 248, 107 P. 309 (1910) ; Bandosz v. Daigger
& Co., 255 Ill. App. 494 (1930); Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co. et al.,
22 Mont. 312, 56 P. 358 (1899); Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., 274 N. Y. 106, 8
N. E. (2d) 296 (1937) ; Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N. Y. 345, 197
N. E. 306 (1935) ; Drake v. Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 85 A. 14 (1912).
39 Cramer v. Nuccetelli, 2 Misc. (2d) 508, 151 N. Y. S. (2d) 544 (1956).
40 Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N. E. 182 (1892); Thrift v. Vandalia R.
Co., 145 Ill. App. 414 (1908); Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N. E. 1113
(1893) ; Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N. W. 693 (1899);
Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n et al., 154 Neb. 805, 49 N. W. (2d) 707 (1951)
Kelly v. Muhs Co., 71 N. J. L. 358, 59 A. 23 (1904).
41 Litch v. White et al., 160 Cal. 497, 117 P. 515 (1911) ; Carroll v. Hemenway
et al., 315 Mass. 45, 51 N. E. (2d) 952 (1943) ; Wynn v. Sullivan, 294 Mass. 562,
3 N. E. (2d) 236 (1936) ; New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Anderson,
73 Neb. 84, 102 N. W. 89 (1905); New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v.
Bendson, 73 Neb. 49, 102 N. W. 96 (1905) ; Beehler v. Daniels et al., 19 R. I. 49,
31 A. 582 (1895).
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or statutory duty.42 It is interesting to note that subsequent Massachusetts
cases have expressly overruled the Parker case on this particular point.
43
Before the present case, the Illinois law on the subject of landowner-
occupier liability to firemen and policemen injured on private premises
was limited to five cases denying relief
44 and two cases granting recovery.45
The Illinois Supreme Court announced in the Gibson case what was to
become the majority rule; namely, that, absent a statute or municipal
ordinance, a member of a public fire department entering the premises
in an emergency in the discharge of his duty is a mere licensee, to whom
no duty is owed, except to refrain from willful or affirmative acts which
are injurious. In addition, it was held that firemen were not entitled to
the benefit of an ordinance which was in express terms intended for the
protection of factory employees. The applicability of this general rule
was extended to policemen in Eckels et al. v. Maher4 6 and in Casey v.
Adams.47 The Illinois Appellate courts in Thrift v. Vandalia R. Co.48
and Volluz v. East St. Louis Light & Power Co.49 followed the previous
decisions; however, an attempt was made in the Thrift case to distinguish
it on the ground that the alleged ordinance was general in its terms. The
court stated: "An ordinance which could properly be construed to impose
upon a railroad company the duty to anticipate the presence of persons,
even peace officers in the performance of their official duties, upon its
private right of way necessarily at rare intervals and at unexpected times
and places, and to exercise continuous vigilance to avoid injuring them,
would be manifestly unreasonable, and seriously interfere with the prac-
tical operation of railroads. ' '5  But in granting relief in Bandosz v.
Daigger & Co.,51 the Illinois Appellate Court felt that firemen should
receive the benefit of legislation stated in general terms, as their duties
42 Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N. E. (2d) 1008 (1936);
Davy v. Greenlaw et al., 101 N. H. 134, 135 A. (2d) 900 (1957).
43 Carroll v. Hemenway et al., 315 Mass. 45, 51 N. E. (2d) 952 (1943) ; Aid-
worth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N. E. (2d) 1008 (1936) ; Wynn v.
Sullivan, 294 Mass. 562, 3 N. E. (2d) 236 (1936).
44 Casey v. Adams, 234 Ill. 350, 84 N. E. 933 (1908); Gibson v. Leonard, 143
Ill. 182, 32 N. E. 182 (1892) ; Volluz v. East St. Louis Light & Power Co., 210 Ill.
App. 565, (1918) ; Thrift v. Vandalia R. Co., 145 Il. App. 414 (1908) ; Eckels et al.
v. Maher, 137 Ill. App. 45 (1907).
45 Ryan v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 315 Ill. App. 65, 42 N. E. (2d) 128 (1942);
Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., 255 Ill. App. 494 (1930).
46137 Ill. App. 45 (1907).
47234 Ill. 350, 84 N. E. 933 (1908).
48145 Ill. App. 414 (1908).
49210 Ill. App. 565 (1918).
50 145 Ill. App. 414 at 416.
51255 Ill. App. 494 (1930). Therein, it was held that whether the defendant's
violation of the ordinance and statute constituted wanton and willful conduct was
a question of fact for the jury.
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require them to go into places of danger which should not be increased
by the presence of unlawful quantities of volatile combustibles. Recovery
was also granted in the Ryan case where the distinction was made between
active negligence and negligence resulting from the actual condition of
the premises. As previously noted, it was in this case that the court
criticized the traditional licensee-invitee formula. Therefore, it is not
surprising that in the instant case the Illinois Supreme Court relied to
some extent upon the Ryan and Bandosz decisions in abandoning the
licensee-invitee formula and in extending the protection of ordinances,
being in general terms, to firemen and policemen.
The factual situation in the present case enabled the Illinois Supreme
Court to place great reliance upon the New York rule requiring land-
owners and occupiers to keep that portion of the premises normally used
as a means of access in a safe condition for all persons lawfully entering
thereon. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that: ". . . we would agree
with the court in the Meiers case, and with its adherents, that an action
should lie against a landowner for failure to exercise reasonable care in
the maintenance of his property resulting in the injury or death of a
fireman rightfully on the premises, fighting the fire at a place where he
might reasonably be expected to be."5 2 Query, can a fireman or policeman
reasonably be expected to be at a place that is not customarily used as
a means of egress and ingress? The language of the Illinois Supreme
Court could have been limited to the precise factual situation presented,
but it would seem that the language used might have left the door open
for a liberalization in the future of the limited New York rule. It seems
ironic that the court which promulgated the strict majority rule should
render a decision which might possibly be used in the future to further
a trend aimed at avoiding the harshness of its original pronouncement.
G. R. LAMBERT
SUBROGATION-ASSIGNMENT OR BENEFIT OF SECURITY OR INCUMBRLANCE
-WHETHER A SUBSEQUENT LENDER IS SUBROGATED TO RIGHTS OF ORIGINAL
CONDITIONAL VENDOR AS AGAINST AN INTERVENING CHATTEL MORTGAGEF-
In the recent case of Western United Dairy Company v. Continental
Mortgage Company' a reviewing court of Illinois was presented for the
first time with the question of whether the doctrine of conventional subro-
gation was applicable to a series of transactions involving personal prop-
erty rather than realty. The plaintiff therein obtained and recorded a
5220 Ill. (2d) 406 at 416-417, 170 N. E. (2d) 881 at 886. Italics added. For
a treatment of the present case, see 49 Ill. B. J. 594.
1 28 Ill. App. 2d 132, 170 N. E. 2d 650 (1960).
